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Owing to the complex nature of vector-borne diseases (VBDs), whereby monitoring of
human case patients does not suffice, public health authorities experience challenges in
surveillance and control of VBDs. Knowledge on the presence and distribution of vectors
and the pathogens that they transmit is vital to the risk assessment process to permit
effective early warning, surveillance, and control of VBDs. Upon accepting this reality,
public health authorities face an ever-increasing range of possible surveillance targets
and an associated prioritization process. Here, we propose a comprehensive approach
that integrates three surveillance strategies: population-based surveillance, disease-based
surveillance, and context-based surveillance for EU member states to tailor the best surveil-
lance strategy for control ofVBDs in their geographic region. By classifying the surveillance
structure into five different contexts, we hope to provide guidance in optimizing surveil-
lance efforts. Contextual surveillance strategies for VBDs entail combining organization
and data collection approaches that result in disease intelligence rather than a preset static
structure.
Keywords: vector-borne diseases, surveillance, one health, disease burden, threat, emerging diseases
INTRODUCTION
Globalization and human population growth continue to put
increasing pressures on human health and well-being. Emerging
diseases have become a growing threat leading to the development
of epidemic intelligence systems to aid public health authorities.
The main aim of this epidemic intelligence is to encompass all
activities that permit the early identification of potential health
hazards, their verification, risk assessment, and investigation in
order to inform and improve public health control measures in
a timely manner (1). Epidemic intelligence integrates both an
indicator-based and an event-based component; the former refer-
ring to structured collection of data through routine surveillance
systems and the latter referring to data gathered from sources of
intelligence of any nature (2). Finally, good epidemiologic judg-
ment, the reasoning process that indicates when there is sufficient
data on which to make public health decisions (1), is essential. This
has been a challenging component in the past but even more so
today with mandated transparency of public decisions, and a con-
tinuously changing interconnected world. Further, it has become
apparent that an interdisciplinary approach to the prevention and
control of zoonoses is invaluable. Cross-sector working ensures
better preparedness and contingency planning, more efficient
and effective surveillance systems, cost-sharing between sectors
according to their benefits of control, increased health equity, and
improved sharing of logistics and costs for service provision (3).
In recent years, efforts to improve the collaboration between the
public and veterinary health, has paid off (4). Since the trans-
mission cycles of several zoonotic pathogens occur in nature,
involvement of stakeholders of forest and nature management is
a logical next step. This means combining organization and data
collection approaches that result in disease intelligence (2) rather
than a preset static structure.
In recent decades, vector-borne diseases (VBDs) have emerged
as a significant threat to human health in temperate areas (5). In
Europe, the incidence and geographical distribution of endemic
VBDs, specifically Lyme borreliosis, are increasing in several areas
(6). Also, West Nile fever is emerging in Europe (7). Other
VBDs have appeared outside the regions where they originally
circulated such as dengue in Madeira (8). And last but not
least, novel VBDs have emerged or have recently been recog-
nized, such as infections with the tick-borne Borrelia miyamo-
toi (9). Considering the already occurring disease burden and
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FIGURE 1 | Schematic representation of the various health disciplines
involved in vector-borne diseases.
various emerging threats for the future, cost-effective VBD sur-
veillance is challenging. Investment in networks keeping a close
watch on the matters within their expertise, public health, vet-
erinary, and ecohealth (Figure 1) is needed. Here, ecohealth
is defined as the combined health effects of (changes to) the
ecologic network in which we function. This also includes the
implications of nature management decisions and land use on
factors influencing VBD epidemiology. Each and every pathogen
has its own disease ecology; therefore, the combined effect of
changes affecting factors like, for instance, reservoir species dis-
tribution, vector densities, and human exposure, is inheritably
complex.
We aim to develop a strategy for the surveillance of vector-borne
pathogens, on a national as well as a Pan-European context. When
developing and structuring VBD surveillance strategies, consid-
eration of potential prospectives for action is important. Here,
we present the building blocks of such contextual surveillance
strategy. We expand the surveillance pyramids conventionally used
as the basis of public health surveillance to pyramid assemblies,
encompassing data from livestock (and pets), wildlife, and vector
population. Next, we customize the pyramid assemblies to specific
diseases, here focusing on those transmitted by mosquitoes and
ticks. The contextual surveillance strategy of VBDs is further illus-
trated using examples from the Netherlands. Finally, we link the
national with Pan-European VBD surveillance strategies.
BUILDING BLOCKS
POPULATION-BASED SURVEILLANCE
To adequately monitor the disease burden of VBDs related to their
occurrence, information is needed from different subgroups of
the human population, represented by a disease burden pyramid.
However, the forecasting, early detection, prevention and control
of VBDs requires knowledge of other parameters. Acquiring data
on the presence and density of (infected) vectors complements
the disease burden pyramid for VBDs. In the case of a zoonotic
VBD, an additional level is required to encompass the density of
(infected) reservoir hosts (10). Actually, for each of these layers
(10), a surveillance pyramid of their own can be drawn, which
can be used when developing a contextual surveillance strategy.
Separate surveillance pyramids can also be drawn for each of the
additional population groups (e.g., sentinels or affected animal
populations), highlighting all possible targets and levels of sur-
veillance, forming a surveillance pyramid assembly (Figure 2).
The distinction between wild and domestic animals is necessary
to match the different health disciplines involved in the data col-
lection (see also Figure 1). For all pyramids, the level of “infectious
population” is added to better assess transmission risks. While all
surveillance pyramids have the same organization, not all levels
occur in every pyramid. For example, the top four surveillance
levels of the pyramid do not exist for vectors. An additional point
is that some pyramids might be absent in the surveillance pyramid
assembly (see below).
DISEASE-BASED SURVEILLANCE
To accurately describe all possible targets of surveillance for a spe-
cific VBD, tailoring the surveillance pyramid assembly is impor-
tant. Some vector-borne pathogens, such as malaria, dengue, and
chikungunya, can be maintained in a human-vector-human cycle,
with no involvement of animals in the transmission cycle. Most
vector-borne pathogens, however, circulate among vectors and
(wild) reservoir animals. Here, humans frequently act as dead-
end hosts, from which pathogens are not transmitted to other
susceptible hosts, in nature; non-natural routes of transmission
(e.g., through blood transfusion) or “rare” routes (e.g., mother-
to-child transmission) are not considered here. In these cases, the
infectious level is omitted from the human surveillance pyramid
(Figures 3A–C and 4B). The same holds for animal species that are
dead-end hosts (Figures 3A and 4B). In some cases, the addition
of a pyramid for animals, that are neither a reservoir nor a host,
but may serve as a sentinel for exposure, can be useful. Spill-over
of tick-borne encephalitis virus, for example, has been revealed in
dogs and deer in Belgium (11, 12). Similarly, chickens may serve as
sensitive sentinels for West Nile virus (WNV) without contribut-
ing to the virus transmission cycle. Vector surveillance usually
entails data on the population sizes and the infection rates.
CONTEXT-BASED SURVEILLANCE
The concept of surveillance pyramid assemblies offers a systematic
approach for identifying all possible targets and levels of surveil-
lance of any VBD. The next step is to develop a cost-effective
strategy for surveillance for VBD, which largely depends on the
purpose of the surveillance. Selecting the particular layers of each
population to include as sensible targets for surveillance depend
on the contexts of VBDs. A surveillance strategy should be based
on the identification of the involved levels for a certain disease and
the technical/laboratory methods (defining the feasibility) that can
support the surveillance of that level (10).
The presence of a vector is a prerequisite for the transmission
of a VBD. While the absence of a vector prevents transmission,
the presence of a vector does not imply that actual transmission
of a pathogen is occurring or will occur in the future. Based on
this premise, the status of a VBD can be described in five different
contexts based on the presence or absence of the three facets of
VBDs important for public health: human cases, pathogens, and
vectors (Table 1) (10). In short, VBDs with disease burden in a
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FIGURE 2 | Surveillance pyramid assembly of a hypothetical vector-borne zoonosis. Not all levels exist in surveillance pyramid of all populations. The color
scheme used refers to Figure 1.
country fall under context 1 and the remainder fall under one of
the other four contexts (Contexts 2–5).
To identify, assess the risk, communicate, and ultimately con-
trol VBDs, monitoring and surveillance tools, appropriate to the
context, are needed (10). Generally, the current impact of a health
problem is assessed through burden of disease calculations, while
the impact of future outbreaks in an area is determined through
quantitative risk assessments. Although applicable for endemic
VBDs (context 1, Table 1), such quantitative assessments would
not be sensible for the remaining VBD contexts without actual dis-
ease burden. Nevertheless, information on these so-called threats
to human health is desirable (10). Consequently, surveillance
efforts for VBDs, that are endemic and cause disease burden, need
to have a different focus and structure than those for VBDs that
are a threat. As a consequence, any surveillance strategy for a VBD
needs to be developed considering its context.
NATIONAL CONTEXT
When comparing tick-borne with mosquito-borne diseases in
Netherlands (Table 1), for example, the most striking difference
arises in context 1, i.e., endemic diseases. While the disease burden
of mosquito-borne diseases is currently zero, the disease burden of
tick-borne diseases, such as Lyme disease, is significant and grow-
ing (14). In the Netherlands, an increase in reported cases of tick
bites and erythema migrans, the first clinical symptom of Lyme
disease, has been reported over the last 15 years (14, 15).
For mosquito-borne diseases in the Netherlands, risk esti-
mates, preparedness, and early warning are the more important
components of risk analyses (10). Risk estimates are very use-
ful in providing insight into the complexity of VBD emergence,
provided that their assumptions, uncertainties, and ambiguities
are taken into account (16, 17). Between 30 and 40 species of
mosquito are indigenous to north-west Europe, many of which
act as potential vectors of pathogens. However, since the eradi-
cation of malaria in the 1960s, no mosquito-borne diseases have
been reported. Still, several endemic mosquito species are proven
vectors of zoonoses or malaria in the laboratory or in the field
elsewhere in Europe. With this in mind, various mosquito-borne
diseases are categorized as context 3. Whether actual transmission
of mosquito-borne pathogens occurs after introduction depends
upon the vector capacity. The consequences of pathogen intro-
duction in a region with a competent mosquito vector popula-
tion can be very quick and significant, as illustrated with WNV
introduction in the United States in 1999 (18) or chikungunya
virus introduction in the Caribbean in 2013 (19). Development
of contingency plans (including outbreak exercises) for potential
emergence and databases with background information are tools
to improve preparedness. For early warning purposes, focus is
placed on improving and updating detection tools for the labora-
tory (20) and field (21) to enable rapid pathogen detection in a
vector, reservoir, or host, when introduced. To this end, knowledge
of the contexts of VBDs in the rest of Europe and more glob-
ally through international collaboration and networks is essen-
tial to enhance preparedness. This also applies to non-endemic
tick-borne pathogens (22).
Here, we further describe surveillance strategies when placed
in context, in reverse order (Contexts 5–1). Overviews of surveil-
lance strategies for a mosquito- and tick-borne example (when
available) in the Netherlands are shown in a box.
Context 5 deals with VBDs that currently do not pose any risk
to the country owing to the current absence of both the pathogen
and vector. The main concern centers therefore on the future
establishment of the vector upon its introduction. Surveillance
of pathogens and/or human cases is not a priority at this stage.
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FIGURE 3 | Disease depended surveillance pyramids of tick-borne diseases, (A) Lyme borreliosis (B) tick-borne encephalitis, (C) Crimean Congo
hemorrhagic fever.
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FIGURE 4 | Disease dependent surveillance pyramids of mosquito-borne diseases (A) Malaria, (B)West Nile fever, (C) RiftValley fever. The pyramid
assemblies for dengue and chikungunya resemble that of malaria, provided that Anopheles spp is replaced by Ae. albopictus and Ae. aegypti as vector.
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Table 1 | Current status of vector-borne diseases in the Netherlands.
Context Disease burden1 Pathogen2 Vector Tick-borne pathogens Mosquito-borne pathogen
1a
√
(every year)
√ √
Borrelia burgdorferi spp. No examples
1b
√
(not every year)
√ √
Borrelia miyamotoi No examples
2 –
√ √
Rickettsia helvetica, Neoehrlichia mikurensis,
Anaplasma phagocytophilum, Ehrlichia &
Babesia, Bartonella
Plasmodium spp
3 – –
√
Tick-borne encephalitis virus Dirofilaria spp., Mosquito-borne viruses
(Batai, Inkoo, Rift Valley, Sindbis
Snowshoe hare, Tahyna, Usutu, West Nile)
4 –
√
– Coxiella burnetti, Francisella tularensis Chikungunya virus; Dengue virus
5 – – – Crimean Congo Hemorrhagic Fever virus Japanese encephalitis virus3
1Locally acquired human case.
2Imported human case, infected animal reservoir, or vector.
3 Potentially European mosquitoes are competent to transmit JEV (13), but this has not been validated.
If vector establishment on the basis of climatic or environmental
constraints is impossible or highly improbable, no surveillance
activities are recommended. However, this assessment needs to be
iterative accounting for changes in the geographic distribution of
the vectors in Europe.
Japanese encephalitis risk to the Netherlands (Context 5)
Japanese encephalitis is endemic to South East Asia. The principal vectors
are Culex mosquitoes, and to a lesser degree, Aedes. The main vector in
Asia, Cx. tritaeniorhynchus, is not present in Europe. Recently, an
ambiguous report on the detection of fractions of this virus in Cx. pipiens in
Italy appeared (13). Until there is conclusive evidence of Japanese
encephalitis virus in Europe, this virus and its main vector are considered
absent in Europe (23). Therefore, no surveillance activities are
recommended.
Crimean Congo Hemorrhagic fever risk to the Netherlands (Context 5)
The main vector of Crimean Congo hemorrhagic fever virus is the hard tick
Hyalomma marginatum and its current known European distribution is
shown in Figure 5. Transmission only occurs in regions within the vector’s
geographic distribution. These ticks have been occasionally imported to
Northwestern Europe on migratory birds (24, 25). Modeling suggests that
the current climate of the Netherlands is unsuitable to sustain a population
of these ticks, with little prospect of their establishment in the foreseeable
future (26, 27), making any surveillance activity in the surveillance pyramid
assembly obsolete. Nevertheless, source-finding activities in response to
incidental findings of specimen to confirm absence of a local population
should be considered.
Context 4 deals with VBDs where although the vector is absent,
the pathogen is regularly introduced. In comparison to context 5,
owing to the introduction of the pathogen, assessments whether
or not the vector can establish, upon introduction, has priority. If
local climatic and environmental conditions permit establishment,
surveillance focusing on detecting the introduction of the vector
at potential ports of entry/risk locations is required. Only the vec-
tor pyramid within the surveillance pyramid assembly needs to be
considered, preferentially also in an international context.
Dengue virus risk in the Netherlands (Context 4) – excluding current
risks in the Dutch OverseasTerritories
Dengue virus is regularly introduced with infected humans returning from
their travel to dengue endemic countries. However, there are no
established populations of the principal vector, Ae. aegypti nor of Aedes
albopictus, in the Netherlands, although Ae. albopictus has been regularly
introduced, but intercepted (28). The current European geographic
distributions of these mosquito species are shown in Figure 5. The climate
is suitable for establishment of Ae. albopictus in Northwestern Europe, but
is unsuitable for Ae. aegypti. Expansions of the latter in Europe is expected,
but even with climate change it is not anticipated to establish in
Northwestern Europe, where the temperature will remain unsuitable (29).
Upon establishment of Ae. albopictus, the risk status will change from
context 4 to 2. The current Dutch policy is therefore to prevent
establishment of vectors by active surveillance and control using biocides
at high-risk areas, since exotic mosquitoes are frequently imported.
Context 3 deals with VBDs that already have established puta-
tive vector populations, but so far there is no evidence of either
pathogen circulation nor pathogen introductions. Surveillance is
therefore focused on detecting the introduction or circulation
of the disease causing pathogen as early as possible to enable
adequate preventive and control measures. This may necessitate
surveillance of the reservoir or sentinels (which may be humans
or animals depending on the disease) and vector pyramids. In
instances, where human cases of vector-borne zoonoses have been
detected earlier than pathogen circulation in an enzootic cycle,
human surveillance needs to be added to the surveillance strategy.
In other cases, the availability or costs of samples determines the
focus of surveillance. For all diseases belonging to this context,
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monitoring on the geographic distribution of the diseases in
Europe is advisable.
West Nile fever risk in the Netherlands (Context 3)
Since human cases (humans as well as horses are dead-end hosts
Figure 4B) can only occur following virus amplification cycles between
bird-biting mosquitoes and birds. Given that endemic mosquitoes are
putative WNV vectors, potentially infected populations of both birds (the
host) and mosquitoes (the vector) are targeted for surveillance in high-risk
areas suitable for transmission from an environmental/climatic point of
view. Upon detection of an enzootic cycle of WNV, adequate preventive
measures including public awareness campaigns, veterinary horse
vaccination campaigns, and mosquito control activities may be
implemented. In the Netherlands, a combined mosquito and WNV
surveillance in the Oostvaardersplassen was started in 2009 and continued
in 2010 with a wider screening for arboviruses, namely WNV, Usutu virus,
Sindbis virus, Tahyna virus, and Batai virus (20, 30) and potential vector
composition (30). In 2012, dozens of wild songbirds that were found dead
in the Netherlands were tested for Usutu virus, but found negative (31). Up
to now, no evidence of mosquito-borne virus circulation has been found in
the Netherlands. Cerebrospinal liquors of humans with encephalitis of
unknown cause were tested for the presence of flavivirus (32, 33). In
collaboration with the Dutch Animal Health Service, a similar survey was
performed on horses. In the UK, routine mosquito surveillance detected
the presence of an additional WNV mosquito vector, Culex modestus in
north Kent. To ensure an updated risk assessment on WNV for the UK,
enhanced surveillance for the mosquito, and virus testing in mosquitoes
and birds was implemented. The mosquito has shown evidence of
expansion, but there is so far no evidence of the virus (34).
Tick-borne encephalitis risk in the Netherlands (Context 3)
While its main vector, the sheep tick I. ricinus, occurs commonly, no
autochthonous cases of tick-borne encephalitis (TBE) has been reported,
nor any evidence of this virus circulating in an enzootic cycle in
Netherlands. A closely related tick-borne flavivirus, named louping ill virus
(LIV), however, is causing disease, predominantly in animals in upland areas
of the UK and Ireland (35). In comparison with mosquito-borne disease
outbreaks, the consequences of pathogen introduction in a region with a
competent tick vector population are generally much more transient. In
endemic areas, the permissive locations for transmission of tick-borne
encephalitis virus are very local and patchy. In addition, the transmission of
the virus between vectors occasionally occurs through co-feeding of
immature stages of the tick on a non-viremic rodent host. Consequently,
the detection of the pathogen soon after introduction is difficult and
requires a very costly and intensive surveillance system. Recent
publications suggest that animals that are neither a reservoir nor a sensitive
host can act as sentinels for the circulation of tick-borne encephalitis virus,
as shown with dogs and deer in Belgium (11, 12). However, the fact that a
safe human vaccine against tick-borne encephalitis exists enables public
health authorities to take effective preventive measures upon detection the
first human case to protect the population for additional human cases, but
not to prevent circulation. Such surveillance strategy aiming at an early
detection of the first human case may be the most cost-effective one.
Context 2 includes VBDs with enzootic circulation of the
pathogen, which so far has not resulted in reported human cases
in the country and VBDs with frequent introduction of infectious
reservoirs into the country, which so far has not resulted in
autochthonous human cases. The presence of an established vector
population for both categories is a requirement within this context.
Malaria risk in the Netherlands (Context 2)
The indigenous mosquito species, Anopheles atroparvus, is capable of
transmitting malaria parasites Plasmodium vivax, but transmission has
ceased in the second half of the last century through reduction of the
vector population, changes in farm management, improved health, and
eradicating the pathogen (36). In recent years, intense mosquito nuisance
caused by An. plumbeus, a putative vector for Plasmodium falciparum, has
been reported regularly in local agricultural area in the Netherlands and
Belgium. Until recently, this species had been breeding only in tree holes,
but has adapted to new breeding ground, namely manure gutters under
abandoned pig stables in Netherlands and Belgium (37). Although human
cases are imported, there is no autochthonous transmission to humans.
The chance of malaria transmission is much more unlikely than arboviral
transmission given the non-zoonotic nature of malaria. While dengue cases
are infectious before or even without developing symptoms, patients
infected with falciparum-malaria become infectious only after developing
symptoms, which permits an opportunity to prevent subsequent
transmission.
Non-Borrelia tick-borne disease risk in the Netherlands (Context 2)
The sheep tick I. ricinus is responsible for the vast majority of human tick
bites. In ticks in the Netherlands, a total of six (groups of) pathogens can be
distinguished. For four groups, no association with human cases has been
found (yet) (Table 2) (38). The latter may be due to one of the following
causes. First, humans do not develop symptoms when infected with these
pathogens (in this case, microorganisms would be the correct term).
Second, humans do develop symptoms when infected with these
pathogens, but these symptoms are mild and go unnoticed. Third, humans
do develop symptoms when infected with these pathogens, but these
symptoms are atypical and ambiguous and diagnosed under another
cause. Fourth, humans do develop symptoms when infected with these
pathogens, but these infections are travel-related. Rickettsia helvetica, can
infect humans, but whether it causes symptoms and therefore disease
burden is unclear.
Context 1 deals with VBDs that result in human cases or dis-
ease burden every year (Context 1a) or infrequently (Context 1b)
(Table 1). In the Netherlands, as mentioned earlier, there are two
tick- and no mosquito-borne diseases belonging to these contexts.
To halt the increase in disease incidences, management (control
and intervention) strategies for one or more of the three compo-
nents (disease burden, pathogen, and vector) and the environment
are important.
Borrelia miyamotoi risk in the Netherlands (Context 1b)
In 2012 in the Netherlands, a tick-borne disease switched from context 2 to
context 1b, as a result of a case of meningoencephalitis caused by relapsing
fever spirochete Borrelia miyamotoi (9). Since there are no diagnostics
available yet, the possibilities for surveillance are limited. Development of
diagnostics has been prioritized to help to investigate the form of the
human disease surveillance pyramid. Possibly the disease belongs to
context 1a, but until evidence is provided it will be assigned to context 1b.
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Lyme disease risk in the Netherlands (Context 1a)
For the majority of Europe, including the Netherlands, Lyme disease
belongs to context 1a. Because of the large and growing number of human
infections, the epidemiology, ecology, and prevention of Lyme borreliosis is
receiving vast public, political, and scientific interest in the Netherlands (14,
39–43). The strong increase in incidence has several biological,
environmental, and societal reasons. The two main reasons for the
increase are increases in the level of exposure of humans to ticks and
increases in the abundance of infected ticks (44). Environmental change
factors are also exacerbating the risk (45).
PAN-EUROPEAN CONTEXT
Public health authorities are required to prepare for future threats
and call for predictions of the likely changes in public health
risks. Usually, they focus their preparedness on their own geo-
graphical region. Whereas, the context of a disease is essential
to design a surveillance strategy, assessing the context of VBDs is
actually an issue for many public health authorities as the necessary
information is not always readily available. In other words, in some
cases surveillance data are required to assess the context, in which
the subsequent surveillance strategy is prioritized. In addition, for
all diseases belonging to contexts 3–5, national health experts are
required to monitor the geographic distribution of the diseases,
pathogens, and vectors in Europe.
To assist EU member states in this task, the European Centre
for Disease Prevention and Control (ECDC) runs various pro-
grams to aggregate data to develop Pan-European maps on vector
distribution and VBD incidence, to identify drivers of change
and to provide guidance (10, 45–48) (Figures 5 and 6). Based
on such data, assessing the context of a particular VBD in each
European country seems to be a rather straightforward task. Cen-
tral databases, however, on infections of wildlife with vector-borne
pathogens are lacking or incomplete, making the assessment of the
pathogens category difficult. When ignoring this category, context
2 and 4 are effectively omitted from the Pan-European maps on
VBD contexts, hindering appropriate risk assessments on national
and international level. Through the Eden FP6 and Edenext FP7
FIGURE 5 | Geographic distribution of major vectors in Europe:
ticks: Hyalomma marginatum, vector of Crimean Congo
hemorrhagic fever (top left), Ixodes ricinus, vector of Lyme
borreliosis and tick-borne encephalitis (top right), andAe.
albopictus (bottom left) andAe. aegypti (bottom right), vectors of
dengue (source: ECDC).
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programs, huge steps have been made with collecting data and
identifying drivers for pathogen circulation (49). Following on
from data collected on human cases and vectors, the aggregation
of data on pathogen circulation in reservoir species is the final
step in developing Pan-European maps of VBDs, based on their
national context.
CONCLUSION
Cataloging all possible surveillance activities on VBDs without
putting these into context does not assist public health authorities
Table 2 | Pathogens found in Dutch I. ricinus ticks.
Pathogen I. ricinus
(n)
Tick infection
rate (%)
Dutch human
cases reported
Borrelia burgdorferi s.l. 628 (5308) 11.8 Yes
Rickettsia helvetica 1265 (4061) 31.1 No
Anaplasma phagocytophilum 44 (5343) 0.8 No
Babesia spp. 112 (4238) 2.0b No
Neoehrlichia mikurensisa 300 (5343) 5.6 No
Borrelia miyamotoia 6 (300)b 2.7 Yes
aNew to the Netherlands.
btested in pools.
with assessing comparative risk. Here, we propose a way for-
ward for public health authorities to assess potential surveillance
approaches for VBD based on its context and on a country-by-
country basis. Surveillance efforts for VBDs that are endemic
have a different focus and structure than those for VBDs that
do not pose any immediate risk as neither the pathogen nor
vector is present. Within the context of a VBD, the best sur-
veillance strategy depends on the potential prospects for action
and the costs/benefit analysis. This is particularly important given
economic constraints, and therefore, a focus on interventions
that achieve the largest health gain per euro spent seems emi-
nently appropriate. For some VBDs, taking action prior to a VBD
becoming an issue is preferable. Once a decision for interven-
tion to decrease the disease burden (or group/category of dis-
eases) or to mitigate a threat has been made, surveillance should
be implemented in order to measure the effectiveness of this
intervention (10).
It has become apparent that an interdisciplinary approach to
the prevention and control of zoonoses is invaluable. Cross-sector
working also ensures better preparedness and contingency plan-
ning,more efficient and effective surveillance systems,cost-sharing
between sectors according to the benefits of control, increased
health equity and improved sharing of logistics and costs for
service provision (3). The field of integration of animal and
human disease surveillance is new, but growing (4). Since the
FIGURE 6 |West Nile fever map of Europe (Source: ECDC).
www.frontiersin.org December 2014 | Volume 2 | Article 280 | 9
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Braks et al. Vector-borne disease intelligence
transmission cycles of several zoonotic pathogens occur in nature,
involvement of stakeholders involved in environmental manage-
ment and biodiversity-enhancing strategies is the next logical step.
This requires an extension of the data collection approaches to
further enhance disease intelligence (2) rather than a preset static
structure. The described contextual surveillance for VBD extended
with veterinary and wildlife health along with public health is
highly applicable in a One Health approach.
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
The authors would like to thank Wim van Bortel, Hervé Zeller,
Chantal Reusken, and Wim Ooms for their comments on ear-
lier version of the document. The authors wish to thank the
Vbornet consortium for helpful discussions and two anonymous
reviewers for their valuable input. In addition, they highly appre-
ciated the support of the Dutch Food and Consumer Product
Safety Authority and by the Dutch Ministry of Health, Welfare
and Sports (VWS).
REFERENCES
1. Thacker SB, Dannenberg AL, Hamilton DH. Epidemic intelligence service
of the centers for disease control and prevention: 50 years of training and
service in applied epidemiology. Am J Epidemiol (2001) 154(11):985–92.
doi:10.1093/aje/154.11.985
2. Paquet C, Coulombier D, Kaiser R, Ciotti M. Epidemic intelligence: a new frame-
work for strengthening disease surveillance in Europe. Euro Surveill (2006)
11(12):212–4.
3. Leach M, Scoones I. The social and political lives of zoonotic disease models: nar-
ratives, science and policy. Soc SciMed (2013) 88:10–7. doi:10.1016/j.socscimed.
2013.03.017
4. Wendt A, Kreienbrock L, Campe A. Zoonotic disease surveillance – inventory
of systems integrating human and animal disease information. Zoonoses Public
Health (2014). doi:10.1111/zph.12120
5. World health Organization. The Vector-Borne Human Infections of Europe: Their
Distribution and Burden on Public Health. Copenhagen: WHO Regional Office
for Europe (2004).
6. Rizzoli A, Hauffe HC, Carpi G, Vourc’h GI, Neteler M, Rosà R. Lyme borreliosis
in Europe. Euro Surveill (2011) 16(27):pii:19906.
7. Hubalek Z, Halouzka J. West Nile fever – a reemerging mosquito-borne viral
disease in Europe. Emerg Infect Dis (1999) 5(5):643–50. doi:10.3201/eid0505.
990506
8. Sousa CA, Clairouin M, Seixas G, Viveiros B, Novo MT, Silva AC, et al. Ongo-
ing outbreak of dengue type 1 in the autonomous region of Madeira, Portugal:
preliminary report. Euro Surveill (2012) 17(49):pii:20333.
9. Hovius JW, de Wever B, Sohne M, Brouwer MC, Coumou J, Wagemakers A,
et al. A case of meningoencephalitis by the relapsing fever spirochaete Bor-
relia miyamotoi in Europe. Lancet (2013) 382(9892):658. doi:10.1016/S0140-
6736(13)61644-X
10. Braks M, van der Giessen J, Kretzschmar M, van Pelt W, Scholte EJ, Reusken C,
et al. Towards an integrated approach in surveillance of vector-borne diseases in
Europe. Parasit Vectors (2011) 4:192. doi:10.1186/1756-3305-4-192
11. Roelandt S, Heyman P, De Filette M, Vene S, Van derStede Y, Caij AB, et al.
Tick-borne encephalitis virus seropositive dog detected in Belgium: screening
of the canine population as sentinels for public health. Vector Borne Zoonotic
Dis (2011) 11(10):1371–6. doi:10.1089/vbz.2011.0647
12. Linden A, Wirtgen M, Nahayo A, Heyman P, Niedrig M, Schulze Y. Tick-
borne encephalitis virus antibodies in wild cervids in Belgium. Vet Rec (2012)
170(4):108. doi:10.1136/vr.e646
13. Ravanini P, Huhtamo E, Ilaria V, Crobu MG, Nicosia AM, Servino L, et al. Japan-
ese encephalitis virus RNA detected in Culex pipiens mosquitoes in Italy. Euro
Surveill (2012) 17(28):pii:20221.
14. Hofhuis A, Herremans T, Notermans DW, Sprong H, Fonville M, van der
Giessen JW, et al. A prospective study among patients presenting at the general
practitioner with a tick bite or erythema migrans in The Netherlands. PLoS One
(2013) 8(5):e64361. doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0064361
15. Hofhuis A, van der Giessen JW, Borgsteede FH, Wielinga PR, Notermans
DW, van Pelt W. Lyme borreliosis in the Netherlands: strong increase in GP
consultations and hospital admissions in past 10 years. Euro Surveill (2006)
11(6):E0606222.
16. Sedda L, Morley DW, Braks MA, De Simone L, Benz D, Rogers DJ. Risk assess-
ment of vector-borne diseases for public health governance.PublicHealth (2014)
128(12):1049–58. doi:10.1016/j.puhe.2014.08.018
17. Fischer EA, Boender GJ, Nodelijk G, de Koeijer AA, van Roermund HJ. The trans-
mission potential of Rift Valley fever virus among livestock in the Netherlands:
a modelling study. Vet Res (2013) 44(1):58. doi:10.1186/1297-9716-44-58
18. Kilpatrick AM. Globalization, land use, and the invasion of West Nile virus.
Science (2011) 334(6054):323–7. doi:10.1126/science.1201010
19. Van Bortel W, Dorleans F, Rosine J, Blateau A, Rousset D, Matheus S, et al.
Chikungunya outbreak in the Caribbean region, December 2013 to March 2014,
and the significance for Europe. Euro Surveill (2014) 19(13):pii:20759.
20. Reusken C, de Vries A, Ceelen E, Beeuwkes J, Scholte EJ. A study of the circula-
tion of West Nile virus, Sindbis virus, Batai virus and Usutu virus in mosquitoes
in a potential high risk area for arbovirus circulation in the Netherlands, “De
Oostvaardersplassen”. Eur Mosq Bull (2011) 29:66–81.
21. Ibáñez-Justicia A, Scholte EJ, Reusken C, de Vries A, Dik M, Braks M. An addi-
tional tool for arbovirus surveillance in the Netherlands: the use of honey-
baited cards to detect circulating mosquito-borne viruses. Proc Dutch Entomol
Soc (2012) 23:63–71.
22. Jahfari S, Fonville M, Hengeveld P, Reusken C, Scholte EJ, Takken W, et al. Preva-
lence of Neoehrlichia mikurensis in ticks and rodents from North-west Europe.
Parasit Vectors (2012) 5(1):74. doi:10.1186/1756-3305-5-74
23. Cleton N, Koopmans M, Braks M, Reusken C. Japanse encefalitis in Zuid-
Europa? Ned Tijdschr Med Microbiol (2013) 21(1):7–11.
24. Nijhof AM, Bodaan C, Postigo M, Nieuwenhuijs H, Opsteegh M, Franssen L,
et al. Ticks and associated pathogens collected from domestic animals in the
Netherlands. Vector Borne Zoonotic Dis (2007) 7(4):585–95. doi:10.1089/vbz.
2007.0130
25. Jameson LJ, Morgan PJ, Medlock JM, Watola G, Vaux AG. Importation of
Hyalomma marginatum, vector of Crimean-Congo haemorrhagic fever virus,
into the United Kingdom by migratory birds. Ticks Tick Borne Dis (2012)
3(2):95–9. doi:10.1016/j.ttbdis.2011.12.002
26. Gale P, Stephenson B, Brouwer A, Martinez M, de laTorre A, Bosch J, et al. Impact
of climate change on risk of incursion of Crimean-Congo haemorrhagic fever
virus in livestock in Europe through migratory birds. J Appl Microbiol (2012)
112(2):246–57. doi:10.1111/j.1365-2672.2011.05203.x
27. Estrada-Pena A, Sanchez N, Estrada-Sanchez A. An assessment of the dis-
tribution and spread of the tick Hyalomma marginatum in the western
Palearctic under different climate scenarios. Vector Borne Zoonotic Dis (2012)
12(9):758–68. doi:10.1089/vbz.2011.0771
28. Scholte E, Den HartogW, Dik M, Schoelitsz B, Brooks M, Schaffner F, et al.
Introduction and control of three invasive mosquito species in the Netherlands,
July-October 2010. Euro Surveill (2010) 15(45):pii:19710.
29. Rogers DJ, Suk JE, Semenza JC. Using global maps to predict the risk of dengue
in Europe. Acta Trop (2014) 129:1–14. doi:10.1016/j.actatropica.2013.08.008
30. Reusken CB, de Vries A, Buijs J, Braks MA, den Hartog W, Scholte EJ. First evi-
dence for presence of Culex pipiens biotype molestus in the Netherlands, and of
hybrid biotype pipiens and molestus in northern Europe. J Vector Ecol (2010)
35(1):210–2. doi:10.1111/j.1948-7134.2010.00080.x
31. Reusken C, Zutta DE, Kik M, Cleton A, Rijks J, Schmidt-Chantasit J, et al. Geen
bewijs voor Usutuvirus als oorzaak van sterfte bij zang vogels in Nederland
(herfst 2012). Tijdschr Diergeneeskd (2014) 139(3):28–30.
32. Rockx B, van Asten L, van den Wijngaard C, Godeke GJ, Goehring L, Ven-
nema H, et al. Syndromic surveillance in the Netherlands for the early detec-
tion of West Nile virus epidemics. Vector Borne Zoonotic Dis (2006) 6(2):161–9.
doi:10.1089/vbz.2006.6.161
33. Koppelman MH, Sjerps MS, de Waal M, Reesink HW, Cuypers HT. No evi-
dence of West Nile virus infection in Dutch blood donors. Vox Sang (2006)
90(3):166–9. doi:10.1111/j.1423-0410.2006.00754.x
34. Medlock JM, Vaux AG. Distribution of West Nile virus vector, Culex modestus,
in England. Vet Rec (2012) 171(11):278. doi:10.1136/vr.e6123
Frontiers in Public Health | Epidemiology December 2014 | Volume 2 | Article 280 | 10
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Braks et al. Vector-borne disease intelligence
35. Jeffries CL, Mansfield KL, Phipps LP, Wakeley PR, Mearns R, Schock A, et al.
Louping ill virus: an endemic tick-borne disease of Great Britain. J Gen Virol
(2014) 95(Pt 5):1005–14. doi:10.1099/vir.0.062356-0
36. Verhave JP. Experimental, therapeutic and natural transmission of Plasmodium
vivax tertian malaria: scientific and anecdotal data on the history of Dutch
malaria studies. Parasit Vectors (2013) 6(1):19. doi:10.1186/1756-3305-6-19
37. Dekoninck W, Hendrickx F, Vasn Bortel W, Versteirt V, Coosemans M, Damiens
D, et al. Human-induced expanded distribution of Anopheles plumbeus, exper-
imental vector of West Nile virus and a potential vector of human malaria in
Belgium. J Med Entomol (2011) 48(4):924–8. doi:10.1603/ME10235
38. Coipan EC, Jahfari S, Fonville M, Maassen CB, van der Giessen J, Takken W,
et al. Spatiotemporal dynamics of emerging pathogens in questing Ixodes rici-
nus. Front Cell Infect Microbiol (2013) 3:36. doi:10.3389/fcimb.2013.00036
39. Coumou J, Hovius JW, van Dam AP. Borrelia burgdorferi sensu lato serology in
the Netherlands: guidelines versus daily practice. Eur J Clin Microbiol Infect Dis
(2014). doi:10.1007/s10096-014-2129-4
40. Tijsse-Klasen E, Jacobs JJ, Swart A, Fonville M, Reimerink JH, Brandenburg
AH, et al. Small risk of developing symptomatic tick-borne diseases following a
tick bite in The Netherlands. Parasit Vectors (2011) 4:17. doi:10.1186/1756-
3305-4-17
41. Gassner F, Verbaarschot P, Smallegange RC, Spitzen J, Van Wieren SE, Takken W.
Variations in Ixodes ricinus density and Borrelia infections associated with cattle
introduced into a woodland in The Netherlands. Appl Environ Microbiol (2008)
74(23):7138–44. doi:10.1128/AEM.00310-08
42. Mulder S, van Vliet AJ, Bron WA, Gassner F, Takken W. High risk of tick
bites in Dutch gardens. Vector Borne Zoonotic Dis (2013) 13(12):865–71.
doi:10.1089/vbz.2012.1194
43. Beaujean DJ, Gassner F, Wong A, van Steenbergen JE, Crutzen R, Ruwaard D.
Determinants and protective behaviours regarding tick bites among school chil-
dren in the Netherlands: a cross-sectional study. BMC Public Health (2013)
13:1148. doi:10.1186/1471-2458-13-1148
44. Sprong H, Hofhuis A, Gassner F, Takken W, Jacobs F, van Vliet AJ, et al. Cir-
cumstantial evidence for an increase in the total number and activity of Bor-
relia-infected Ixodes ricinus in the Netherlands. Parasit Vectors (2012) 5:294.
doi:10.1186/1756-3305-5-294
45. Medlock JM, Hansford KM, Bormane A, Derdakova M, Estrada-Peña A, George
JC, et al. Driving forces for changes in geographical distribution of Ixodes ricinus
ticks in Europe. Parasit Vectors (2013) 6:1. doi:10.1186/1756-3305-6-1
46. Medlock JM, Hansford KM, Schaffner F, Versteirt V, Hendrickx G, Zeller H,
et al. A review of the invasive mosquitoes in Europe: ecology, public health
risks, and control options. Vector Borne Zoonotic Dis (2012) 12(6):435–47.
doi:10.1089/vbz.2011.0814
47. Zeller H, Marrama L, Sudre B, Van Bortel W, Warns-Petit E. Mosquito-borne
disease surveillance by the European centre for disease prevention and control.
Clin Microbiol Infect (2013) 19(8):693–8. doi:10.1111/1469-0691.12230
48. Guidelines for the Control of Mosquitoes of Public Health Importance in Europe.
WHO Regional Office for Europe & EMCA (2013). 42 p. Available from: http://
www.emca-online.eu/documents/visitors/EMCA_guidelines_Speyer_2011.pdf
49. Available from: http://www.edenext.eu/publications
Conflict of Interest Statement: The authors declare that the research was conducted
in the absence of any commercial or financial relationships that could be construed
as a potential conflict of interest.
Received: 15 July 2014; paper pending published: 17 August 2014; accepted: 01
December 2014; published online: 22 December 2014.
Citation: Braks M, Medlock JM, Hubalek Z, Hjertqvist M, Perrin Y, Lancelot R,
Duchyene E, Hendrickx G, Stroo A, Heyman P and Sprong H (2014) Vector-borne
disease intelligence: strategies to deal with disease burden and threats. Front. Public
Health 2:280. doi: 10.3389/fpubh.2014.00280
This article was submitted to Epidemiology, a section of the journal Frontiers in Public
Health.
Copyright © 2014 Braks, Medlock, Hubalek, Hjertqvist , Perrin, Lancelot , Duchyene,
Hendrickx, Stroo,Heyman and Sprong . This is an open-access article distributed under
the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License (CC BY). The use, distribution
or reproduction in other forums is permitted, provided the original author(s) or licensor
are credited and that the original publication in this journal is cited, in accordance with
accepted academic practice. No use, distribution or reproduction is permitted which
does not comply with these terms.
www.frontiersin.org December 2014 | Volume 2 | Article 280 | 11
